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With the stable development of the socialist market economy, the listed 
company has become an important part of the market economy of our country. 
Through a series of investigations show that the ownership structure of listed 
companies and the control of closely related companies take the optimal 
ownership structure is conducive to the stability control, allowing the company to 
develop smoothly in the stationary environment. With the advent of the era of 
global economy, we see the rising scale of enterprise management, with strong 
financial advantage, enterprise group's controlling shareholder wanton use of 
control rights, in view of the small and medium-sized shareholders, even the 
social public interests deprivation, has a great extent affect the normal operation 
of enterprises, breaking the normal order of the market economy, limited get 
more rapid development of the socialist economy, so as to bring the economic 
growth in China limited. Faced with this situation, according to the discussion of 
the ownership structure, control of the company has not stopped, the public asked 
the government and the relevant part of the regulation against the abuse of 
corporate control behavior, resolutely resist malicious use of control bring the 
negative influence to the enterprises and the public. Our government and relevant 
departments have been concerned about the issue of corporate control, but also to 
curb the abuse of control. The abuse of control power struggle, we see vigorously 
against the government and relevant departments, enterprises also see to seek 
better future efforts, control abuse phenomenon can be alleviated to a certain 
extent, but not completely eliminated. Ownership structure is the basic content of 
corporate governance, determines the efficiency and the development direction of 
corporate governance, ownership structure will become an important basis for 
affecting the company control right transfer, equity structure in moderate 
conditions, control market of company governance behavior effectively and 














this background, the research for the influence on the control right of the listed 
company equity structure in this paper, in the course of the study on "Vanke 
equity dispute" as a case, the corresponding effects are discussed in detail the 
ownership structure of listed companies control. 
The key point of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership 
structure and control right of listed companies. In this paper, three kinds of cases, 
such as the high concentration of equity, the low proportion of equity circulation 
and the low proportion of executive stock ownership, are used to analyze the 
effects of these three kinds of ownership structure. Based on the position of the 
long-term stable development of listed companies, in the face of the unreasonable 
ownership structure of listed companies, listed companies should be what kind of 
help for our legislative and judicial, legislative and judicial practice to help guide 
the adjustment of ownership structure of listed companies, to prevent the 
"shareholder equity transfer" and "hostile takeover" and other related acts so, the 
listed company survival and development environment can be more stable. 
Through a series of research, concluded that the optimization of ownership 
structure to promote corporate governance norms, to create a good legal 
environment to promote the control of legal norms, improve the market for small 
and medium-sized shareholders legal protection system and standardize the 
information disclosure system of market supervision and supervision of listed 
companies is more conducive to the protection of the legitimate rights and 
interests, help the listed companies ownership structure, stability control of the 
company, to avoid the transfer of corporate control rights to other stakeholders 
damage, thereby promoting the healthy development of the listed company is 
better, to promote China's socialist market economy more prosperous. 
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